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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the State of Utah

RALPH REID and MILT STAMOULIS,
Appellants,

vs.
OLUF H. ANDERSEN, ELLEN M. ANDERSEN, his wife; and S. M. KALM,
d.b.a. KALM & SON REAL ESTATE
COMPANY and STERLIN.G G. WEBBER,

ReSJ]JrOndents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS ANDERSEN

Appeal from Third District Court
Salt Lake County, Utah
H{)n. A. H. Ellett, Judge
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah

RALPH REID and MILT STAMOULIS,

Appellants,
vs.
OLUF H. ANDERSEN, ELLEN M. ANDERSEN, his wife; and S. l\1. KALM,
d.b.a. KALM & SON REAL ESTATE
COMPANY and S'TERLING G. WEBBER,

Case No.

7183

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'TS ANDERSEN

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Appeal by plaintiffs from dismissal on demurrer of
their amended complaint which p~ayed a declaration of
rights as to specific performance (or damages) against
defendants Anders~en upon an alleged $10,000 sales agreement of Salt Lake City land signed by only one plaintiff,
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Reid, as buyer and by Andersen alone, as seller, and
not by his wife.
Plaintiffs joined Kahn and Son, a real estate bro~er
and Webber, a s~alesman, as defendants notwithstanding
they manifestly had no concern in the controversy between the buyer and s·eller strictly over specific performance or damages. The broker and salesman only
received and held a $500 down payment which Reid left
with them in attempting to make the purchase.
1

T·he broker and salesman did no1t defend. Defendants
Andersen filed separate demurrers for uncertainty, misjoinder and non-s·eparation of causes of action, misjoinder of parttes, ·and insufficiency of the complaint.
The demurrers were sustained with leave to amend
against Andersen but without leave as against his wife
who had not signed the agreement.
Dismissal on the merits was entered in the wife's
favor March 2,1948. ('Tr. 56).
Plaintiffs refused to amend and proce·ed against
Andersen. The allowed time passed and the action was
dismissed as to him also. ( Tr. 64).
Later, although they did not defend and were in
default, judgment of dismissal was ·entered in favor of
Kalm mid Webber ('Tr. 66). They were not repres·ented.
Defendants Andersen did not procur in any manner
their disillissal. It must have be·en ·entered at plaintiffs
instance.
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3
Plaintiffs appeal from the _three dismissal judgments: (1) the dismis·sal in favor of the wife who did not
sign the contract, (2) the dismissal afterward in favor
of Andersen as against whom plaintiffs deliberately refused to plead over and to correct by amendment the
misjoinder of causes of action and parties etc., pointed
out, and which might readily have be€n done, the court
having extended them the opportunity, and, ( 3) 'the dismissal as against Kalm and Webber which plaintiffs procured apparently themselves.
But this is the brief of def€ndants Anders·en. As to
the dismissal of Kalm and Webber ,they ·are not concerned. Their only concern is jilie dismissal in, favor of
themselves. These were proper as will be shown. They
must be affirmed.
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n
STATEMENT OF FACTS ALLE'GED

The amended complaint (petition) must be analyzed.
It states:
1. The residence of defendants. (Tr. 33).
2. That Kalm and Son and Webber were,
on information and belief, agents for defendants
Andersen under a listing contract, the contents
of which.are unknown.
3. The description of the land.
4. That Andersen acquired the land from
a named grantor and on information and belief
that his wife's only interest is statutory and inchoate. (Tr. 34).
5. On information and belief, Andersens
authorized the broker to secure a purchaser for
$10,000 and to accept $500 down.
6. That on or about May 31, 1947 the Plaintiffs agreed to pay $10,000 cash for said property.
That said terms were agreeable to the Defendants
Oluf H. Andersen and Ellen M. Andersen, and
that said acceptance thereof is evidenced by a
certain Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement,
bearing date of May 31, 1947, a copy of which
is attached hereto marked Exhibit ''A'' and by
reference made a part hereof. 'That Plaintiffs
made a part payment, and there was part performance of said agreement by Plaintiffs paying
$500, to the aforesaid agent, which was duly accepted and received, for and on behalf of the
Defendants Andersen and Andersen. Upon acceptance of the $500 down payment, Plaintiff allege
upon information and belief, that they received
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
constructive, if not actual, possession of the property which was merely an unenclosed vacant lot.
Pursuant to said possession Plaintiffs went on
to the land and formulated pJans and specifications for construction of a building thereon. That
the only thing remaining to be done by Defendants Andersen and Andersen was the execution
of final transfer papers, there being no fuPther
negotiations contemplated and the deal was closed.
That ''possession'' was expressly ''given immediately on closing," as shown by Plaintiff's
Exhibit "A". (Tr. 34).
S
t
r

t

r
i
1
a
c l
k
e c
n
u
b r
Y t
Tr.
4255.

°

7. Upon information and belief Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant Ellen M. Andersen agreed
to all of the terms and conditions of the S'ale and
told Defendant Oluf H. Andersen, her husband,
in the presence of Defendants S. M. Kalm and
Sterling G. Webber that she approved of the
terms and that the entire transaction was agreeable to her. Pursuant thereto the Defendant Oluf
H. Andersen signed the Earnest Money Receipt
and Agreement at his home and in the presence
of his wife, but the Defendant Ellen M. Andersen did not personally sign. said Earnest Money
Receipt and Agreement for the reason that she
was not requeJsted to sign,l but upon information
and belief Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Kalm
and Webber signed for and on behalf of Defendant Ellen M. Andersen as "agents". That although said purchase price is a fair and reasonable figure for said property, Plaintiffs believe,
and therefor allege upon information and belief
that_ said refus,al to convey is based upon the
fraudulent intent of the Defendant Oluf H. Andersen :to avoid conveyance to the Plaintiffs and
accept a higher offer which he may have received
since entering into the agreement herein alleged.
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8. That plaintiffs tendered and hereby
tender the $9500 balance but Andersens refuse to
a-ccept and convey.
9. That plaintiffs are partners and Reid
acted for the partnership in signing the Earnest
Money Receipt.
·
10. That Defendants brought the abstract of
title up to date and delivered it to Plaintiffs for
examination. That suggested additional entries
were made by Defendants and the title approved
by the Plaintiffs. That Plaintiffs acted in good
faith in entering into this agreement, and relied
upon the representation that a good marketable
title would be conveyed evidencing the sale. After
making the part payment afore~aid, and taking
posses sion, Plaintiffs went to a great expense
preparing to build on said property and have incurred great expense in the purchase of materials
and incurred obligations for the construction of
a ·building on said property. That Plaintiffs have
been or will be damaged irreparably and in excess of the purchase price of s'aid land, unless
specific performance is ordered hy the court. That
the market value of said property is subject to
broad fluctuation and therefore time is the essence of this aetion.
1

10. (sic) That $750 is a reasonable attorney's
fee to be awarded Plaintiff's attorney for services in this action if no appeal is taken.

11. Plaintiffs are uncertain about their rights
and therefore petition for a de-claratory judgment
against the defendants.
WHEREFORE : Plaintiffs pray for a declaratory judgment :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1. 'Yhether plaintiffs are entitled to specific
performance and a conveyance. (Tr. 36).
2. If not entitled to s·pecific performance
from both defendants Andersen, whether plaintiffs are so entitled from Andersen alone, subject to the wife's statuto~y dower with abatement
of the purchase price to cover her subsequent assertion thereof or indemnity against the same.
3. If not entitled to specific performance
whether plaintiffs may have damages.
4. And if so, what items and amounts are
payable by which defendants.

5. For such further declaratory statements
of rights as may be proper, and further relief, and
for costs and attorney's fees. (Tr. 37).

Attached to the amended petition was a
printed copy of the alleged sales agreement denominated ''Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement. '' ( Tr. 38). 'This contains two separate independent parts or agreements: (1) first a separate receipt signed by Kalm and Company, only,
to Reid (not Andersens~) in which Kalm acknowl-edges he has received $'500 from Reid, ( Andersens
are nowhere mentioned), and, ( 2) a separate
agreement at the foot of the page following the
receipt and signature of Kalm and wholly apart
therefrom signed by ·Reid and Andersen only,
(not by his wife). The receipt and agreement provide:
THE RECEIPT.
has received from Reid
on the purchase price
Southeast corner Main
99 x 111 ~' for $9,000,

Kalm acknowledges he
$500 to secure and apply
of vacant property at
and Hollywood Avenue,
the balance $8,500 to be
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paid on acceptance and de}ivery of deed, possession to be given immediately on closing etc.,
etc. If seller does not approve in five days return of the $500 by the broker cancels the sale.
Seller agrees to pay Kahn his commission. (Tr.
38).
(Signed) K'Ol!m & Son R1eal EsM.t·e Agent
by (Signed) Sterlitng G. Webber
'THE AGREEMENT. We do hereby agree
to carry out and fulfill the terms and conditions
on the above receipt specified, the seller agreeing to furnish a good marketable title with abstract to date, or policy of title insurance at the
option of the seller and to make final conveyance
by sufficient deed. If either party fails so to do,
he agrees to pay the expenses of enforcing this
agreement, including a reasonable attorney''S fee.
I will accept. $10,000
x f's I Ralph Reid
Cash
OK )s I Ralph Reid
)sl 0. H. Andersen
Purchaser
Seller
Approved Salt Lake Real Estate Board
(Tr. 38)
'The trial court sustained the separate demurrers of
defendants Andersen. This as we will see was proper.
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III
ARGUMENT
1.

The Amended Petition Was Uncertain AS' To
Whether Plaintiffs Relied Upon A Cause Of
Action Upon A Written Contract Affecting
Only Andersen Or Upon A Ca;.use Of Action ·
On An Oral Contract Mf,ecting Only His Wi:fie.

The code provides that defendants may demur to a
complaint "when one or more of the following objections thereto appears upon the face thereof":
''That the complaint is ambiguous, unintelligible or uncertain." §104-8-1 (7).
Defendants Andersen filed separate identical demurrers. Each alleged:
3. That said amended petition is. uncertain
in that it cannot be as1certained therefrom whether
there is attempted to be pJeaded therein ( 1) a
cause of action upon a written agreement for the
sale of real property, or, ( 2) a cause of action
upon an oral agreement for sale of real property
and part performance thereunder by the vendees,
-the one cause of action affecting only defendant Oluf H. Andersen and the other affecting
only defendant Ellen M. Andersen. (Tr. 44, 50).
The ground selected was plain. Taking the whole
complaint it showed (1) that Andersen signed up with
Reid, but, ( 2) that his wife did not sign. The copy attached shows this plainly. (Tr. 38). 'The complaint confesses it by the odd ~allegation that:
''Ellen M. Andersen did not personally sign
said Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the reason that she was not requested to sign.''
(Tr. 35).
So we have a complaint for specific performance (or
damages) charging in a single statement that (1) one
defendant, Andersen, signed a contract to sell, but, (2)
that his wife did not sign,-and seeking relief as against
both.
If the complaint contained a cause of action against
Andersen it could only be upon the writing that he signed.
But if it contained one against Mrs. Anders·en, his wife,
it was upon her oral agreement as charged in the complaint by the statement "that defendant Ellen M. Andersen agreed to all o{ the terms and conditions of the sale
and told defendant Oluf H. Andersen, her husband, in
the presence of defeJ?.dants S. M. Ka:lm and Sterling G.
Webber that she ,approved of the terms and that the entire transaction was agreeable to her,'' coupled with an
attempted charge of part performance ''that plaintiffs
made a part payment and ther.e was part performance"
etc. (Tr. 3'5, 34).
The two alleged obligations arise upon distinct agreements. His upon a writing. Hers upon an oral undertaking. They are even controlled by d.if£erent statutes of
limita~ion. His six years. Hers four years. §104-2-22,
§104-2-23.
'The code declares that uncertainty is a ground of
demurrer, and this court has held it is.
''Ordinarily the remedy for uncertainty or
in a pleading lies in a special de-

unin~elligihility
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murrer which is equivalent to a motion to make
more certain, and not in a motion to strike.''
Bamberger Co. vs. Certified Prodtu.ctions Inc.,
88 U. 213,53 P. 2nd 1153.
The complaint was wholly uncertain as to whHther
the cause of action claimed was upon a written or an
oral contract. The demurrer upon that ground was properly sustained.
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2.

There Was A Misjoinder Of Causes Of Action.
They wer.e Not Sepamtely Stated. They Did
Not Affect All The Parties To The Action.

·The ·code provides that several causes of action may
be joined (united) in the same complaint, specifying
them, hut concludes as follows :
''But the causes of action so united must all
belong to one of these classes and ·except in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages and of
other liens must affect all the parties to the
1action, must not require different places of trial,
and they must be sep:arot;,ely stated. §104-7-3.
The code also provides as ground of demurrer:
''That several causes of action are improperly united; or, are not separately stated.'' §1048-1 (5).
We have seen that plaintiffs attempted to plead two
distinct causes of action ( 1) one against Andersen on
the written agreement, and, ( 2) anoth·er against his wife
on an oral agre~ment and part performance. The plaintiffs claimed oddly enough throughout the, pJeading that
the writing affected both Andersen and his wife. Plaintiffs were not particular on which claim they might
succeed if only the court would hold Andersen and his
•
wife, both, in some way.
Kalm and his salesman were joined too. And thus
plaintiffs pleaded different claims, (1) against one or
another or some of the defendants,. hut not all, a~d,
(2) claims which were not separately stated.
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But the code says that if different claims are joined
(united) they must affect all the parties and they must
be separately stated. And so defendants Andersen each
demurred:
'' 4. T.hat several causes of action are improperly united and are not separately stated
in said petition, to wit :
(a) One cause of action for specific performance of the alleged written agreement, earnest money receipt afores1aid, and claimed by plaintiffs to affect both of- the defendants Andersen,
and
(b) Another and different cause of action
for damages for breach of said written agreement and affecting defendant Oluf H. Andersen
only and not affecting defendant Ellen M. Andersen and all other defendants to the action, and
(c)' Another and different cause of action
for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to sell real property and part performance
thereof affecting defendant Ellen M. Andersen
only, and not affecting defendant Oluf H. Anders•en and all other defendants to the action.
(d) The three several causes of action aforesaid each affecting only Plaintiffs and defendants Oluf H. Andersen or defendant Ellen M.
Andersen, as the case may he, and not affecting
all other parties to the action. (Tr. 45, 51).
Ground (a) pointed out that plaintiffs claimed the
amended petition charge~ ·an obligation by both Andersen and wife upon the writing and that this claim afSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fected said defendant•s only (not Kalm, and not Webber,
too).
Ground (h) demons·trated that plaintiffs (at least
alternatively) claimed a distinct cause of. action for
damages against Andersen upon the writing signed by
lrim (not his wife) and this distinct claim, the demurrer
showed, did not affect Andersen's wife; also, that it
did not affem Kalm and Webber. In short, that it did
not affect ~all the parties to the action.
Ground (c) showed the complaint charged an oral
agreement and part performance by and against the wife
and this claim affected her only, not also her husband;
and not Kalm and Webber, too.
Ground (d) finally illustrated that the three claims
above affected Andersen and his wife, or Andersen or
his wife, as the case might be, but did not affect all
other parties to the action also. (Kalm and Webber).
And so the grounds noted were all within the provisions of the code upon demurrer. The several claims
were upon distinct obligations. One written. One oral.
The claims were as against one or another or some only,
but not all, of the defendants. They were packaged together in one ple·a; not separately stated. And each claim
did not affect all the parties to the action.
Since they were not separately stated the demurrer
was good. And since they did not affect all the parties
to the action the claims were not propedy united. For
these improprieties the demurrers were properly sustained.
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3.

There Was A Misjoinder Of Parties Deflendant.
We have seen the code provides that all claims united
in a complaint must affect all the parties to the action.
§104-7-3. And that the several claims did not affect all
parties, but only affected one or another or some of them ;
not all.

The code also provides as a ground of demurrer :
''That there is a defect or misjoinder of
parties, plaintiff or defendant.'' §104-8-1 ( 4).
And so defendants Andersen each separately demurred:
'' 5. That there is a misjoinder of p3:rties
defendant, to wit, misjoinder (a) of defendant
Oluf H. Andersen who is alleged to have signed
and become a party to said alleged earnest money
receipt, and (b) of defendant Ellen M. Andersen
who is affirmatively alleged and shown not to
have signed said agreement, and (c) defendant~
Kalm and W ehber who are not alleged or shown
to have any interest in the subject matter of the
action." (Tr. 45, 51).
The demurrer in the particulars stated is self-proving. Anders·en is charged upon his written obligationthe ·sales agreement which he signed. His wife did not
sign. Her obligation, if any, can rest only upon the alleged oral promis·e by her and part perrormance by the
plaintiffs. And Kalm and Webber were not parties to
either of those alleged claims written or oral. 'They
neither signed nor were parties to either. They were
parties to a different and distinct writing: the receipt
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which they gave Reid for the $500 down payment. The
controvery over specific performance (or damages)
can be waged only between the plaintiffs and d~fendants
Andersen; not Kalm and W ebher.
Thus misjoinder of defendants resulted by the complaint. The wife cannot be joined upon the claim against
her husband on the writing which it is said he signed;
nor he upon her alleged oral promise. The two are distinct claims. 'They require distinct and separate suits
against distinct and separate obligors. Kalm and Webber
could not be joined with Andersen or wife upon the claim
for specific performance (or damages). They could have
nothing whatever to do with a conveyance which a court
might order Andersen and wife, or either of them, to
make to plaintiffs. Kalm and Wehber would not be par.ties to any such conveyance. And for obvious reasons
they would ha~e no part in a judgment against Andersen for damages for failure to convey. That judgment
could run only in f~avor of plaintiffs and only against
· Andersens, or one of them.
And so the demurrer for misjoinder of parties defendant was properly sustained.
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4.

Ellen M. Anderson . Did Not Sign The Agreement. She Was Not A Party To It.

Before discussing the next ground of demurrer (uncertainty of the alleged agency which it is claimed Andersens had previously given the broker) we will discuss
the wife's not having signed the written agre·ement.
Her signature is not on the instrument. (Tr. 38).
But plaintiffs are zealous in attempting to draw her
into the writing (to avoid the bar of the statute of
frauds) and, since she did not sign, they continually cast
about for some means of putting a signature on the· writing for her. And so, ingeniously, they ~suggest that perchance Kahn's signature followed by the printed word
"agent" might be implied as hers where K:alm signed
on the line marked agent. Remember, they allege that
she did not personally sign "for the reason she was
not requested to sign.'' (Tr. 3'5).
But to try and get her on the writing in some way
at least they go on to say, not positively-for that would
commit them-but only evasively, that ''on information
and belief plaintiffs allege that Kalm and Webber signed
for and on behalf of defendant, Ellen M. Andersen.''
(Tr. 35).
But assume for argument the wife ha;d actually
authorized Kalm to sign for her. He did not so sign. H·e
signed only the receipt. And he did not sign her n·ame
at all. The usual agency signature would have been '' Ellen M. Andersen by Kalm & Sons, agent." Nor does he·r
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name appear in the body of the receipt or the body of the
contract below.
The rule is:
''If the agent merely adds the word 'agent'
to his signature in a document, not otherwise
manifesting that he is not a party, it is inferred
that he alone is a party to the transaction.''
Restat·ement, Ag.ency §156.
''Ordinarily the mere fact that a person adds
to his signature a word such as 'agent,' 'manager,' 'treasurer,' or the like, without stating that
he is contracting in behalf of another, are not
regarded as preventing a personal obligation from
attaching to the signer; such words are deemed
not to change the character or capacity of the person signing, but to be merely descriptive of 'him,
or, to use the legal term, descriptio personae.'' 2
Am. Jur., Agency, §244.
Furthermore, the receipt says it must he approved
by the seller within 5 days:
''This payment is made. subject to the approval of the seller and unless so approved within
5 days from date hereof the return of the money
herein receipted f;!hall cancel .this sale·,'' etc. ( Tr.
38).
Now Andersen subsequently 'Signed his approval in
the 0ontract he low the receipt. (For $10,000.00, not
$9,000.00, as the buyers had offered). But Andersen's wife
did not. She did not sign her approval either personally
or b,y agent. Yet if Kalm had been her agent to sell and
sign why, if he signed for her in the receipt, did he not
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al~o sign her required approval' He 'had Andersen sign.
His approval was necessary. But her approval was not
signed in person or by agent. She simply was never party
to the writing.

All that can be deduced is that Kahn was a real estate agent as the descriptive term is generally understood. He signed a receipt to Reid for the $500.00 down
payment. And as all real estate agents. do on the printed
form ''approved Salt Lake Real Estate Board'' ('Tr.
38) this real estate agent signed and added the "de- .
scriptive'' word ''agent.'' Of course, in law, Kalm became an agent. Agent for Reid when Reid deposited the
money with him. He was Reid's agent to ho~d the money
to abide the sale or to return it if Andersen did not '' approve" within 5 days; or even to return it if Reid withdrew his offer before Andersen aooepted and approved.
Mrs. Andersen did not sign personally. Kalm did
not sign for her. She was not a party to the ~sales agreement.
·
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5.

If Kalm Actually Was Agent For The Wife
Tbe Alleged "Listing'' 'Contmct Was Not
Pleaded With Piroper Oertainty.

We have seen that Andersen's wife did not sign and
that Kahn did not sign for her.
But assume for argument that in signing his own
name Kalm attempted to sign for her as the plaintiffs
would imply. The demurrer as to those circumstances
was well grounded, notwithstanding.
Upon information and belief only, plaintiffs allege
that before the sales contract was made Kahn & Webber were agents of defendants Andersen,"for the purpose of selling or obtaining a
purchaser." (Tr. 33).
Furthermore, and only on information and belief,
they stated that the alleged agency was in writing (as
it must be under the statute of frauds §33-5-3 and
§33-·5-4 (5) ), and that the agency was:
"Evidenced by a 'real
tract.'' ( T·r. 33).

es~tate

listing' con-

Then it is as,serted that Kalm & Wehber signed for
Mrs. Andersen, presumably by authority of their prior
agency to ''sell'' or ''obtain a purchaser'' as· ''evidenced
by the real estate listing contract.''
Defendants Andersen demurred. The particular
ground at this juncture was for uncertainty as to the
alleged agency-listing agreement:
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'' 1. That said amended petition is uncertain
in that the terms, provisions and conditions, if
any, of the alleged agency agreement referred to
on information and belief in :Paragraph 2 and
denominated 'real estate listing contract' are not
alleged or set forth either positively or on informatio~ or belief or at all." (Tr. 44, 50).

The ground of objection was well founded.
As to the wife plaintiffs sought to apply her signature to the agreement through that of Kalm, the broker,
by authority of the alleged ''listing contract'' to ''sell or
obtain a purchaser.'' But like those of otheli special
agents the powers of real estate brokers are limited and
to be strictly construed :
''An agent authorized to sell real estate is
generally deemed to be a special agent acting
under a limited power rather than a general
agent. He can have only the power to do those acts
specifically named in his contract of agency.
Moreover, his authority to sell is to be strictly
construed.'' 2 Am. Jur., Agency, §142.
And courts construe agency contracts for the ""Sale"
of land as:
''Merely authorizing the· agent to find a purchaser and submit his offer to the principal for
acceptance, ·and consequently as not empowering
the agent to execute a contract of sale in behalf
of this principal. This is, as a general rule, the
construction put on the employment of professional brokers or real eSJtate agents.'' 2 Am. Jur.,
Agency,·§ 137.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
Consequently, an ordinary contract for the employment of a real estate broker does not authorize him to
sign a contract of sale for his principal.

''A real~estate broker, under the ordinary
contract of employment, has no implied authority
to execute a contract of sale in behalf. of his principal. Such authority must be expressly conferred
upon him or necessarily implied from the terms of
the particular contract. . . . Ordinarily, there
is no implied authority to execute a contract of
sale from a mere listimg of the property with a
broker, even though the owner specifies the terms
of sale, from a mere employment to find a purchaser or to sell real estate.'' 8 Am. Jur., Brrokers,
§61. (italics added).
In Payne vs. Jennifngs (Va.), 48 A.L.R. 628, an
owner "listed" his property with a real estate broker
to ''·sell'' at $12,000.00, payable $3000.00 cash and the
balance on specified terms, and ag~eed to pay a eommission. The broker found a buyer and signed a contract
of sale for his principal. upon the terms required. But
the owner renounced and refused to be bound. The court
of appeals upheld him ruling that the re-al estate agent
had no power to sign a ~sales contract.
''A real estate agent is generally a .special
agent of limited powers, and those dealing with
him deal at their peril. Usually his only authority
. 'is to secure a purchaser who will take the property at a price fixed by the owner. He cannot, unless e~pr:essly or impliedly authorized, execute a
contract of sale on behalf of his principal." 48
A.L.R. page 631, Payne v<S. Jiennitngs, swpro.
\
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The extensive annotation following the decision
shows that the courts uphold the rule of the Fa,yn.e case.
It explains that ordinarily a real estate broker has no
power to sign a contract of sale. 48 A.L.R. 6'35; and that
employment to "find a purehaser" of land will not authorize the broker to sign a sales contract. id. 637; that
the broker must have special authority. ~ id. 637; that
mere authority to ''sell'' does not carry with it the right
to make a contract, id. 638 ; nor does authority to accept
and receipt for a deposit, id. 644; and the mere "listing"
of the property with a broker will not authorize him to
sign a contract of sale. id. 641.
Plaintiffs alleged, but only on information ·and belief,
that Andersen and wife engaged Kalm & Webber as
their agents to "sell" or to "obtain a purchaser" and
that they did so in the alleged "listing" contract. Then
they assert Kalm & Webber signed for the wife as her
agents. But it is not alleged that the agency-listing
agreement contained authority for the broker to sign
a contract of sale for Mrs. Andersen. Lacking that
indispensable allegation the statement that Kahn did
sign in her behalf was futile as the authorities show an
agency merely to ''sell'' or to ''obtain a purchaser'' doe's
not authorize a broker to sign a sales contract; nor does
a m·ere ''listing'' agreement give that authority.
That is all that was alleged. And this the plaintiffs
stated by indirection and not positively - only upon
information and belief. True, they claimed the excuse
that they could not ''specifically set forth the contents
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thereof" because, so they alleged, the same was "within
the knowledge and possession of the defendants". But
they did not state that they themselves did not know
those contents. They might have known them well, .even
though the listing agreement was in the possession of
the defendants.
And while free and ready to make charges throughout the complaint only on information and belief, why
did plaintiffs stop here~ Why didn't they go on and
allege that this phantom listing-agency contained "on
information and helief'' a provision raruthorizing Kalm
to enter into a contract of sale for Mrs. Andersen and
to sign her name thereto. But they did not. We wonder
why.
So the special demurrer challenged for uncertainty
the allegations about the purported written agency in
not setting forth its terms. It wa;s well taken as we
have seen. And as will next be shown, this deficiency
was a mortal one and the attempt to charge the wife
upon the written sales contract thereby failed to state
a cause of action as against her.
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6.

The Complaint Did Not State A Cause Of Action As To The Wif,e Upon The Written Agree•
ment Which She Did Not Sign.

"\Ve have just seen that the demurrers for uncertainty were good as against the allegation that Kalm
signed for ~Irs. Andersen tmder the claimed authority
of an alleged prior agency-listing agreement because it
could not be detected whether Kalm was authorized
therein to sign a contract of sale for Mrs. Andersen.
And since plaintiffs did not allege any of tho'Se terms it
was not asserted-not even on information and beliefthat any term or provision of the alleged agency authoriz~d Kalm to sign_ for her.
True, they claimed (on information and belief) that
she "listed" the property for "sale" with Kalm to "ob- .
tain a buyer''. This is all they charged.· But as we hav,e
already seen, "listing" property with an agent to "sell''
or to "obtain a purchaser'' does not authorize him to
sign a contract of sale for his principal.
Thus, the result of the charge was that Mrs. Andersen authorized and listed the property with Kalm to
find a purchaser or to sell, but that she did not empower
him to sign any contract of sale ; hut that he signed one
anywa;y. This ingenious charge defeats itseU and the
complaint thus failed to state a cause of action upon
the written contract as against Mrs. Andersen. Her
general demurrer thereto was properly sustained.
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7.

M:M. Andersen's Alleged Oral Agreement Was
Barred By The Statute Of Frauds.

Seeking to hold Mrs. Andersen also by way of alleged oral ~greement, plaintiff asserted that she orally
consented to the alleged sale:
'' 7. Upon information and belief plaintiffs
allege that defendant Ellen M. Andersen agreed
to all of the terms and conditions of the sale and
told defendant Oluf H. Andersen, her husband,
in the presence of defendants S. M. Kalm and
Sterling G. Webber that she approved the terms
and that the entire transaction was agreeable to
her." (Tr. 3'5).
Now the statu~e of frauds provide's :
''Every contract . . . for the sale of any
lands or any interest in lands shall be void unless the contract or some note or memorandum
thereof is in writing subscribed hy the party by
whom the ... sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.''
§33-5-3.
Attempting to avoid the statute of frauds as to
Mrs. Andersen and her alleged oral consent, plaintiffs
also averred:
''That plaintiffs made a part payment, and
there was part performance of said agreement''
etc. ('Tr. 34).
Also,
''That defendants brought the abstract of
title up to date and delivered it to pJaintiffs for
examination. That suggested additional entries
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were made by defendants and the title approved
by the plaintiffs. . . . Plaintiffs went to great
expense preparing to build on said prope:rty and
have incurred great expense in the purchase of
materials and incurred obligations for the construction of a building on said property.'' ( Tr.
35).
These allegations, plaintiffs hoped, might take them
around the statute of frauds under the part performance ·section which reads :
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in
case of part performance thereof.'' §33-5-8.
Here, let us point out that part performance applies
only in suits for specific performance. The statute· expressly says so. It is not available in actions for damages. This court has held so :
"Since the second count of the complaint is
based on a breach of the oral agreement to sell the
land, and is an action at law. for money damages,
the doctrine of par.t performance is not available to plaintiff." Baugh vs. Darley, (Utah) 184
Pac. 2nd 335.
So the charge of the wife's oral consent was insufficient as a claim for damages against her and her general
demurrer was good in that regard.
And as a claim for specific performance. against her
it fares no better. The part performance claimed was:
(1) part payment of $500.00 to Kalm (Tr. 34;) (2) that
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plaintiffs actually went on 'the land and formulated plans
to bui~d; (3) that defendants, not plaintiffs, brought the
abstract of title up to date and delivered it to plaintiffs
for examination, and defendants made additional entries
therein ·and plaintiffs approved the title, ( Tr. 35) ; and
( 4) that plaintiffs went to expense preparing to build
and incurred expense for materials and construction.
These alleged acts are insufficient. If pro¥ed they
would not support ·specific performance of an oral agreement. Part payment will not suffice.

''A person acquires no equity in law that can
be enforced in a court of equity by a parol purchase, with a vp,a.rt payment 10f the purchase
money." Maxfield vs. W,est, 6 U. 327, 23 Pac. 754.
Williston affirms the rule :
"It is true that payment of a pecuniary consideration by the buyer is not generally held sufficient justification for ·enforcing specifically an
oral contract to convey land, the purchaser being
left to his quasi contractual remedy of recovering back what he has paid." Willist1on ·on Con.tra.cts, Rev. Ed. §494.
Formulating plans is not part perfo·rmance. These
are merely preliminary or preparatory acts. Preliminary or preparatory acts are insufficient. 49 .A.m. Jur.,
Statube of Fromds, §431. Formulating plans is not unlike the preliminary act of making and securing estimates of cost of. ·an improvement. This is not enough.
101 .A..L.R. 967. ·The note there says.:
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''Making estimates of the cost of an improvement is not a part performance." lOI .A.L.R. 967.
And the charge that the abstract was brought up
and delivered to plaintiffs is no better.
''Nor does the preparation or delivery of abstracts of title constitute a part performance of
such a contract.'' lOl.A.L.R. 966.
It is asserted that defendants, not pl'aintiffs, procured the abstracts to date. But acts of a defendant
cannot constitute part performance. They must he performed by the plaintiff. 101 .A.L.R. 971.
Simply preparing to build, being preparatory and
preliminary, is -also insufficient. 49 Am. Jur., Statute: of
F'rauds, §431. And incurring expense for materi~ls and
construction is only preparatory also and is insufficient.
Moreover, the allegations of part performance· are
fatally deficient.
''It is well settled that the aets of par~t perfl>rmance by the plaintiff, in order to entitle him
to the specific performance of an oral contract for
the purchase of real estate, must have been· performed with the ktnowledge and consent or acquiescence of the defendant.'' 101 .A.L.R. 971.
This is because the basis of the doctrine or part
performance is fraud or inequitable conduct of a defendant.
''Since the basis of the doctrine of part performance is fraud or inequitable conduct on the
part of the person sought to be charged on the
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oral contract; it is well settled that the acts of
part performance by the plaintiff, in oTder to en, title him to the enforcement of an oral contract,
must have been performed with the kn;owledgle wnd
consent or 1acquiesoence of the defendant.'' 49
Am. Jur., Btatut.e of Fr.auds, §432.
Plaintiffs do not allege that the wife knew they were
"formulating pl'ans to build" or that she knew they had
gone to expense "preparing to build" or had "incurred
expense for materials and construction.'' . There is no
, charge that she knew anything about these alleged acts
of part performance-insufficient as they were. But
had they be·en sufficient the alleged acts hy plaintiffs
do not save the charge from the· statute of frauds, for
it is not alleged that they were done with her knowledge
or cons·ent.
Furthermore, it is held that possession is· necessary
to sustain part performance. 49 Am. Jur., Statute of
FraiUJds, §433. Plaintiffs' allegations. here are contradictory and must be resolved against them for the burden
is on them to allege a sufficient case of part performance.. Rargrreaves vs. Burton, 59 1U. 5'7'5, 206 P.ac. 262.
Plaintiffs say (again on information and belief) ''that
they received oonstructime, if not actual possession, of
the property." (Tr. 34). Also, that after making the part
payment "and taking possession" they did the acts of
part performance. (Tr. 35).
In one place they allege they had possession; in
another that they; had only const-ructive possession. The
latter belies the former. Actual possession is necessary
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and they have not charged it. The burden was on them
to allege sufficient part performance. Hargreaves v·s.
Burton, supra. They have failed to do so.
The alleged oral agreement was harred by the statute
of frauds. The acts of part performance claimed were
insufficient to save it from the statute. The general
demurrer of Mrs. Andersen was, therefore, properly
sustained.
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8.

The AllegatJ110ns Charging Oral Consent Were
Stricken By The Trial ·Court.

We have se·en that Mrs. Andersen's demurrer to
the eharge that she orally consented to the sale was well
taken for insufficient supporting allegations of part performance.
So far we have considered the charge of oral consent as if it were a~tually part of the complaint. But
actually it is not; and it was stricken by the court on
motion of Mrs. Andersen. She moved to strike,'' 3.

The following in paragraph 7 :

''Upon information and belief plaintiffs allege that defendant Ellen M. Andersen agreed to
all of the .terms and conditions of the. sale and
told defendant Oluf H. Andersen, her husband,
in the presence of defendants S. M. Kahn and
Sterling G. Webber that she approved of the
terms and that the entire transaction was agreeable to her. Pursuant thereto· the defendant Oluf
H. Andersen signed the Earnest Money Receipt
and Agreement at his home and in the presence
of his wife, but the defendant Ellen M. Andersen
did not personally sign said Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, for the reason that she was
not requested to sign.'' ( Tr. 42). S'ee also P. 5
herein).
The motion was granted and the allegations were
'Stricken. ( Tr. 55). Appellants assign error in the court's
striking ·thi·s out. But they do not argue the assignment.
The error, if any, is therefore waived under the 1ong
established rule.
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Hence, while we have earlier treated the complaint
as if the stricken allegations remained, actually they
are gone and the entire charge of 'Oral consent has wholly
failed.
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9.

nemurrer Is A Proper Pleading In Declaratory
Actions.

""Where the declaration, complaint, or petition shows on its face that the contract is not in
writing as required by the statute, a demurrer
is a proper method of raising th~ defense of the
statute of frauds." 49 Am. Jur., St,atute ·of
F tratUds, §603.
But plaintiffs imply that demurrer . has no office in
declaratory suits. 'This is remarkable. The chapter governing Declaratory .Actions is part of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is contained therein. §104-64-1. It is the
uniform Declaratory Judgment .Act. Martindale-Hubbell,
Utah Law Digest, Judgments. See id., Part VI, .Appendix, Uniform .Acts, for text of Uniform .Act.
The Uniform .Act has no specific provision as to
pleadings. 16 Am. JUtr., Declamlio,ry Judgments, §63.
''It follows that proceedings under these
declaratory acts are governed by the applicable
established rules of pleading." 16 Am. Jur., Declarato'ry Jrudgments, §63.
This court has recognized the· propriety of demurrer
in declaratory suits. Millard Cown)ty vs. Millard Oownty
D'f1aitnange-DiJstrict, 86 U. 475, 46 Pac. 2nd 423. 'The opinion shows the case was considered on demurrer:
'''The appealing defendants demurred to the
on the ground that there was a misjoinder of both parties plaintiff and parties defendant. Such demurrers on the part of the realty
corporations were overruled, and such rulings
are assigned as error."
co~plaint
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10. Other Considerations.

Respondents demurred for uncertainty alleging that
a copy of the Earnest Money Receipt was not attached
to the amended petition as alleged. (Tr. 44, 50). None
was attached to the copy served. We demurred to insure completion of the record. But the record now shows
a copy was actually attached to the original. ('Tr. 38).
We confess this ground ( 2) of demurrer was not well
taken.
Plaintiffs imply, as we read their brief, that they
were entitled to some ''declaration if not relief.'' Of
course they received a declaration as to Mrs. Andersen.
It came in the form of a dismi~sal for want of any cause
of action against her. But it was a declaration no less.
Her dismissal declared they had no case against her.
As to Andersen, they must not complain. They were
given leave to plead over when his deD;lurr·er was sustained. They refused. Dismissal followed. F'Or failure
to amend when invited by the court they cannot complain. The sustaining of Andersen's demurrer on the
special grounds required plaintiffs to correct the misjoinder and other defects by amendment. They refused.
Andersen's dismissal "declared" that their pleading was
not in proper form as prescribed by the Code and that
until plaintiffs conformed they had no right to ''declaration or relief.''
Plaintiffs also make much of a plain typographical
error in Andersen's demurrer. The last ground thereof
alleged failure to ·state a cause of action. But through
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inadvertence it was stated that no cause of action was
stated against defendant Ellen M. Andersen. This should
have been Oluf H. Andersen. Plaintiff.s urge that one
party may not def·end on the ground that no action lies ,
against a co-party. This ordinarily is· the rule. We. confess it. But the other grol1nds of demurrer stated by
Andersen were well taken and the demurrer was sus- ·
tain·ed as it should have been. Furthermore any party
may raise ~he question of insufficiency of a complaint
to state a cause· of action, with or without a demurrer.
Failure to state a cause of action may always be raised
at anytime.
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lll

CONCLUSION

This is a simple case of two plaintiffs claiming that
a man signed a contract to sell lands, hut admitting al~o
that his wife did not join in signing. The. case alleged
is just that simple. Candor would command a recognition of the absolute barrier those circumstances impose.
The wife cannot be held. And the true. facts cannot be
dimmed. They blaze with brilliancy. Ev·en through the
maze cast off by easy charges only on information and
belief the facts shine out. Plaintiffs have no case against
Mrs. Andersen and the trial court was forthright in dismissing her upon demurrer.
As to Andersen, upon the a1'legations charged, plaintiffs have themselves to blame for their travail. They
did not amend when Andersen's demurrer struck them
down for the uncertainty, the misjoinder and improper
union, the non-separation of causes of action and the
other defects which abounded in their pleading. The
court invited them to amend, but they refused. Their
reason is apparent. They were determined not to proceed against Andersen without his wife, for the quality
of interest in Utah land acquired without the joinder of
a wife is dubious. Its only certainty is that it ~s most
uncertain.
Plaintiffs should have amended and proceeded
against Andersen alone. Since they did ·not they are
bound to abide the consequence and the trial court's
dismis'sal as to him upon their defective pleading mu:st
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stand. If plaintiff•s actually thought they could hold
Andersen (and we ho:ld that in the circumstances damages would have provided the limit of their rights) then
they should have am~nded and sued him alone upon a
charge affecting him only. Or they should have dismissed
and sued him over again alone. But they did neither.
'Theirs was the choice. A choice ~ninfluenced by what
Andersen might hope or wish. And now upon deliberate
c;hoosing they find themselves before this bar with no
justificati0n for appeal. Both respondents are dismissed.
But Andersen, because plaintiffs deliberately refused
to /properly plead (which is not to say, however, they
would have been able to prove· their charges). But the
fact r•emains they are out of court as to him hy reason of
deliberate choosing.
Respondents subinit:
(1) The amended petition was uncertain as to
. whether plaintiffs relied upon a caus.e of action on a
writing affecting only Andersen, or upon an oral promi'Se
affecting only his wife ; or upon the alleged writing on
the claim that it affected both of them.
( 2) There was a misjoinder of causes of action.
They were not separately stated and did not affect all
the parties. 'The demurrers pointed out that the plaintiffs claimed the pleading charged both Andersen and
wife upon the writing; charged only Andersen thereon
(not his wife), and that the alleged causes of action each
would not thus affect all the parties to the action, but
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only one or more or 'Some but less than all, including
Kahn and Webber, too.
(3) There was a misjoinder of defendants. Andersen was sued upon an alleged writing; his wife upon
an alleged -oral consent. This misjoinder of defendants
is clear. Kalm & 'Vebber, too, were joined. They had
no place in the controversy over specific :Performance
or damages being waged between plaintiffs and Andersen; certainly none in the controversy over the alleged
oral promise of :Mrs. Andersen.
(4) ~Irs. Andersen did not sign and was not a
party to the alleged contract of s8le. She did not sign it
personally. Her name does not appear therein. The
copy attached shows Kalm signed his own name and that
he signed only the receipt to Reid acknowledging the
$500.00 down payment. He did not 'Sign the contract of
sale or approval. He only signed the receipt. His signature was on a printed line preceding the printed word
agent. Adding agent did not alter his individual capacity. It was only "descriptive". The real contract had
to be ''approved'' within 5 days by the seller. Andersen
is alleged to have signed his approval. But Mrs.. Andersen never did.
(5) But even if Kalm wa·s agent for Mrs. Andersen
and had signed for her he was not authorized. 'The ex..:
tent of his alleged agency was a "listing'' to "sell or
obtain a purchaser.'' Without more he had no power
to sign a contract of sale for Mrs. Andersen. The complaint was uncertain for not alleging the terms of the
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alleged agency for it could not be detected whether it
contained authority for him to sign. Hence, the demurrers were properly sustained for uncertainty.
(6) The complaint did not state a cause of action
against Mrs. Andersen upon the writing which she did
not sign because it did not charge-not even on information and belief-that Kalm was authorized to sign for
her.
(7) Mrs. Andersen's alleged oral consent was barred by the statute of frauds. The part performance
eharged is insufficient. Bringing up abstracts, preparing to build, purchasing materials, etc., in contemplation
of building are only prelUninary and preparatory acts.
They are insufficient as part performance. And what is
most important, it is not ~harged that Mrs. Andersen
knew of those alleged acts. Possession, too, is necessary
in part perfO'rmance cases. Plaintiff's contradict themselves. They say once they had possession, but again
that it was only constructive. Actual posses'sion is necessary. And the. burden to allege ,and prove sufficient
part performance rests on plaintiffs. Hlargre,avies vs.
Burton, supvna. The acts ~harged are insufficient and
the posses:sion :alleged was only constructive. The allegations are entirely confusing and contradictory. Plaintiff'S have not sustained the burden of pleading a clear
case of part performance.
(8) The allegations charging oral consent by Mrs.
Andersen were stricken by the trial court. 'This stripped
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pellants do not argue the alleged error assigned. The
striking was proper, but if wrongful the order stands
for appellants' failure tn argue their assignment, and
the stricken matter is not a part of the complaint.
(9)
tions.

Demurrer is a proper plea in declal"atory ac-

Plaintiffs claim that they were entitled to
some ''declaration''. They have received it. The dismissal of l\Irs. Andersen for want of any case against
her was a declaration as to that. And if they were stop~
ped short of a plenary declaration as to Andersen it was
for their own folly in deliberately refusing to amend
and proceed according to the rules of pleading to the
point where a plenary declaration could result.
(10)

(11) The case is simple. Two plaintiffs charge that
a husband signed a sales contract. They admit his wife
did not. Ensnarled in the legal uncertainty of the value
of a judgment for specific performance (if recovera;ble)
againsi the husband wifuout the wife, they endeavored
to put her signature on that ~agreement which she did
not sign or to hold her to an alleged ora1 consent by
allegations incapable of overcoming the statute of frauds.
Both attempts have failed.

Andersen and wife could never have been
sued in the same action. A single cause of action against
both on t'he writing would always fail against her because
she did not sign and she would be dismis sed. A suit
with one cause of action against Andersen on the writ(12)

1
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ing ·and another against her on the oral consent would
likewise frail for neither cause would affect the defendant
not charged thereon. Neither cause of action would affect
aU the parties to the action. The only possible way in
which both could be ·sued was by separate actions ; one
against Andersen on the alleged writing and the other
against his wife upon her alleged of1al consent. But Kalm
and Webber could not be party to either suit for then
it would not affect all the parties to the action since
Kalm and W ~b ber could not be involved in a controversy
over specific performance or damages sought in favor
of the p[aintiffs and against defendants Andersen.
The demurrer1s were properly sustained. The judgments of dismissal for no cause of aCJtion as against Mrs.
Andersen and for refus·al to amend as against Andersen
when the right was granted were correct. They must be
affirmed with costs to_ respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS & ARMS'TRONG,
Att1orneys for Respondents
Andersen,
July, 1948.
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